Abstract -Honey bee colonies, although highly cooperative, are composed of genetically distinct individuals with differing genetic payoffs from alternative allocations of colony resources among potential reproductive individuals. Therefore conflicts among colony members are expected. This paper analyzes the empirical evidence of these conflicts in sex ratio, nepotism in queen rearing, and worker production of males. Sex ratio conflict is expected to be minimal and hard to measure in honey bees, but behavioral studies might provide insights. Nepotism in queen rearing has been investigated by several studies. The weight of the evidence suggests that weak nepotism does occur. This paper provides a reanalysis of the data of one controversial study and compares the methods and results of others. Mixed negative and positive findings may be due to certain methodological differences, or to polymorphism for this trait. Worker laying is much more common than has long been thought, but nonetheless nearly all adult drones derive from the queen, because worker policing removes nearly all worker-laid eggs. Policing, both of eggs laid and worker ovary development, also may be responsible for complete sterility of most workers. Thus reproductive cooperation in honey bees is underlain by a low level of active conflict. &copy; Inra/DIB/AGIB/Elsevier, Paris kin recognition / nepotism / worker laying / social behavior / Apis mellifera
INTRODUCTION
Honey bees, the best studied social insect species, can provide us with important insights into the balance of cooperation and conflict in evolution of social behavior. Their colonies show a remarkable degree of group level coordination, and honey bee colonies have long been characterized as paragons of cooperation. Pliny idealized the bees' organization as an example and lesson to human society (Fraser, 1951) ; Butler (1609) used the example of the bees to show the divine ordainment of a society, like his own Elizabethan England, ruled by a queen; and from Thorley's (1774) (Wheeler, 1911) Genetic payoffs come in reproduction, and in a honey bee society, propagation of the genes that reside in the individual colony members can take two paths: production of male reproductives (drones) and female reproductives (new queens).
To a large extent, the story of social life in honey bees is the story of maximizing the total of this reproduction through cooperation. Thus we find adaptations for cooperative foraging such as the dance language (von Frisch, 1967) [Adams et al. (1977) estimated [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] matings] and then using semen from these matings in a largelybut-not-completely mixed fashion (Taber, 1955; Page and Metcalf, 1982;  Page, 1986) , so that a colony consists of many subfamilies of workers who share a father within subfamilies, but not between subfamilies. This paper is devoted to the question of whether the theoretical axes of conflict in reproduction identified in figure 1 are specifically reflected in the social behavior of honey bees, and what the consequence of these conflicts is in terms of the evolution of cooperative behavior.
The issues raised here are applicable to a wide range of social species, including social insects, birds, mammals, spiders, and other invertebrates, and the integration of our understanding of the common forces shaping evolution of social behavior is a notable achievement of evolutionary biology over the last 25 years. However, I have restricted this paper to an in-depth analysis of the evidence concerning reproductive competition in just the best studied species: the honey bee Apis mellifera.
CONFLICTS OVER SEX RATIO
Trivers and Hare (1976) , building on Fisher's (1958) (Seeley, 1985; Visscher, 1989 (Free, 1967; Free and Williams, 1975) (Visscher, 1986a (Visscher, 1986b (1989) contained no evidence for nepotism in queen rearing. Visscher (1990) Hoogendoorn and Velthuis (1988) reported that recognition of adult nestmates showed a subfamily bias in contexts with few subfamilies but not when in colonies with many subfamilies. However, Page et al. (1990) pointed out that this effect was due not to discrimination differences but to loss of statistical power with the smaller sample sizes that result from greater subfamily diversity. Moritz and Heisler (1992) (Tucker, 1986) . Visscher and Seeley (see Visscher, 1990) observed interactions of marked workers with an assay like that of Breed (1983) but with the marker coming from an heterozygous (cd/+) mother mated with a single cd drone so that all bees were equally related, but some were phenotypically cordovan and others wild-type. The bees bearing the cordovan marker were treated differently than the wild-type bees. Frumhoff (1991) reported similar results for a feeding assay in observation hives. These effects may result from odor differences arising in melanin formation or lack of it in cordovan bees (with possible buildup of intermediary products in the absence of end-product inhibition). Alternatively they may result from the effects of genes linked to the cordovan locus. In the former case it is unlikely that larvae, which do not synthesize melanin, would have phenotypic differences due to the cordovan allele. As indicated above, in Noonan's (1986) study, the cordovan bees may have behaved differently as adults (more cordovans fed queens, but their numbers among workers of queen rearing age were not reported) and were treated differently as larvae (cordovans were fed more often). (Visscher, 1986; Ratnieks, 1991) . Indeed, it seems remarkable that there is any information at all that bees could use to make kinship judgments of newly hatched larvae, especially since the most likely mechanism they use is a learned reference of their own odors as adults (Visscher, 1986a) , and queen rearing nepotism itself would be expected to reduce the allelic diversity used to determine paternity (Ratnieks, 1991) .
It also may be that nepotism is constrained by the costs it places on the colony level component of an individual's fitness.
In the extreme, this is clearly sufficient:
behavior that involved bees of each subfamily killing all developing queens of other subfamilies would prevent any queen rearing. Ratnieks and Reeve (1992) showed that in singly mated species, queen-rearing nepotism is unlikely to be selected, but is likely under polyandry, unless it sufficiently reduces the efficiency of workers as workers. This 'sufficient' reduction in efficiency is easier to satisfy at high mating frequencies such as are found in honey bees than at lower frequencies, so that queen-rearing nepotism is less likely to be selected both in monandrous and highly polyandrous species than in polyandrous species with lower mating frequency.
Another possibility that has not been investigated is that nepotism is constrained by some kind of policing mechanism similar in principal to what has been found regarding worker laying (see below). An individual bee's biasing of the colony's queen production in favor of her subfamily has a direct cost to bees of other subfamilies, and in a honey bee colony the bees of other subfamilies always constitute a great majority. If workers could detect nepotistic behavior and impose reproductive costs on nepotists, the expected effect would be a reduction in biases in queen rearing that might explain the weakness of this effect found in empirical studies. Bourke (1988) , Visscher (1989) ] found varying small amounts of ovary development among workers in queenright colonies, but nonetheless the prevailing picture of bee colonies was that workers were sterile when the queen was present (e.g. Winston, 1987) .
MATERNITY OF MALE REPRODUCTIVES
Quantitative data on the production of mature drones from worker eggs was provided by a 2-year study of 12 colonies by Visscher (1989) 
Selection against worker reproduction
The existence, but rarity, of worker reproduction in queenright colonies posed the question of why it was so rare, since the coefficient of relatedness of workers is twice as great to their own sons as to their mother's sons. Selection might have produced mechanisms limiting worker reproduction through the interests and actions of the colony's queen, the individual workers themselves, or the other workers in the colony.
Queen control through pheromones inhibiting ovary development has long been suggested as the mechanism limiting worker reproduction [reviewed in Bourke (1988) ]. However, a detailed examination of the timing of queen removal and worker ovary development, and the behavior of 'messenger' workers distributing queen pheromones (Seeley, 1979) generally support the view that the queen pheromones function as a signal of queen presence, with worker ovary suppression as an indirect effect, rather than a sterilizing drug (Seeley, 1985; Visscher, 1989; Keller and Nonacs, 1993; Seeley, 1995) .
A reduction in colony efficiency resulting from a worker laying eggs rather than specializing completely on indirect reproduction (through rearing her mothers offspring) could conceivably be great enough to favor worker sterility. However, calculations that have been done do not support this idea [reviewed in Visscher (1989) ]. This situation leaves the most plausible explanation for the rarity of worker sterility as the mutual policing of reproduction by the workers, first proposed by Starr (1984) , and developed theoretically by Woyciechowski and Lomnicki (1987) and Ratnieks (1988) .
Although each worker is most closely related to drones she herself might produce, in a polyandrous honey bee colony most of the workers will be half sisters to any given worker, and these will be less closely related to her sons than they would be to the queen's sons (figure 2), so that the only stable colony-wide compromise would be to allow production of male (and female) reproductives only by the queen. (Sakagami, 1954) though it does not completely suppress ovary development. The mandibulation behavior looks very much like that described among Polistes wasp foundresses that are correlated with ovary regression in that species. Ratnieks and Visscher (1989) showed that honey bees also have a strong mechanism of worker policing after eggs are laid. In this experiment, eggs from laying workers separated from the queen as above were substituted for eggs laid by the queen in drone cells, and these eggs' treatment was compared to queen-laid eggs which were similarly manipulated. After 24 h, only about 1 % of the worker-laid eggs were still in the comb, while most of the queen-laid eggs remained.
A possible mechanism for this policing would be kin recognition, since workers would be related by 0.25 to the queen's eggs and by 0.125 and to most other workers' eggs (figure 2). However, since Ratnieks and Visscher's (1989) figure 7 , the probability that an egg laid at some time during the inspection interval will remain to the end of the interval can be estimated by assuming they were laid with equal probability throughout the collection interval (the horizontal rectangle, with a height such that its area -the summed probability -is 1), and that after laying they were removed with a constant probability per unit time (shown by the exponential decay curve). The actual proportion of worker-laid eggs among justlaid eggs is then the proportion remaining (the observed datum) divided by the integral of the product of the two probability curves (the area shown in black). Using this method, empirical data on removal rates, and a simulation to correct for small-sample biases in chi-squared tests, Visscher ( 1996) showed that his data were consistent with workers in all his colonies laying between 4 and 14 % of the male eggs collected, with a best estimate of 7.4 %.
Conclusions
Ratnieks (1993) and Visscher's (1996) results demonstrate dramatically more worker laying than has previously been appreciated. The order of magnitude change in proportion of worker-laid eggs after 2 h (2.75 %) and after 16 h (0.29 %) in Visscher's ( 1996) (Ratnieks and Visscher, 1989) , would leave a small proportion (about 0.001) of worker-laid adult drones (Mackensen and Roberts, 1948; Page and Erickson, 1988; Visscher, 1989 The result is, as Seeley (1995) pointed out, that the reproductives produced by a bee colony come nearly exclusively through a shared pathway (the queen), and, so far as we know, distributed nearly fairly in proportion to genetic distribution of the workers. These are the criteria for natural selection to favor the construction of elaborate integration without regard to its effects on individual reproduction, and in the social insects, and particularly the honey bee, we see the effects of this selection.
However, we again encounter a contrast between product and process. The reproductive product is nearly unbiased, paving the way for cooperation, but nonetheless the process which underlies this product displays considerable evidence of conflict. It is a situation analogous to a cold war, with equal attrition on both sides, and deterrence preventing escalation of the conflict. Recent theoretical work has enriched our understanding of the balance between conflict and cooperation. Ratnieks and Reeve (1992) showed that polymorphism might be expected in the balance of selfishness and cooperation. Reeve and Keller (1997) 
